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A revolution is afoot in the law of torts. The all-or-nothing principle
which has reigned supreme for almost two centuries is in retreat. Spurred
by the doctrine of comparative fault which brought sense and balance to
the problem of apportioning loss between parties who are at fault in bring-
ing about harm,' the courts have now begun to apply apportionment for-
mulae to such hitherto uncompromisable questions such as cause-in-fact
and proximate cause.2 Initially, the courts proceeded with halting steps
without calling attention to their deviation from traditional learning. Yet,
one must reckon with the genius of the common law to bring to the courts
a case tailor-made for proclaiming the emergence of new doctrine. In
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins,' the Texas Supreme Court confronted
the problem openly and opted for a doctrine of comparative causation. The
law of torts will never be the same again.
I. GENERAL MOTORS v. HOPKINS-THE SCENARIO
A. The Accident
On June 11, 1971, Robert M. Hopkins, Jr., a 19 year old was rendered a
1. The shift to comparative negligence over the past decade has been dramatic. Prior to
1969 six states had adopted comparative negligence. Since that time 27 states have shifted
to comparative negligence. Several courts have embraced comparative negligence by judicial
opinion. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). For a comprehensive list of the statutes adopted
as of 1976, see Fleming, Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64
CAUF. L. REV. 239 (1976). To that compilation should now be added Pennsylvania. 17 PA.
CONS. STAT. § §2101, 2102 (Supp. 1977). For an incisive analysis of the comparative negligence
doctrine see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
In August, 1977, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. For a full discussion of the Act, see Wade, A
Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What Should it Provide? 10 U. MICH. J. OF L. REF. 220
(1977) and Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault
Act, 29 MERcER L. RV. 373 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976). For a full discussion of this phenomenon, see Twerski, The Use and A buse of Compara-
tive Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797 (1977). The author argues that
courts have indicated that causation problems are subject to either damages or fault appor-
tionment. Thus, in the seat belt cases what some courts have considered to be damage
apportionment problems have been dealt with by others as a matter of fault apportionment.
Cf. Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974) and Bentzler v.
Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). Furthermore, other courts have suggested that
difficult damage apportionment questions might be better resolved by assigning fault percen-
tages to non-joint tortfeasors in second collision cases. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726
(3d Cir. 1976). There are also cases which indicate that courts are using fault apportionment
to compromise difficult cause-in-fact problems. See Barry v. Manglass, 55 App. Div. 2d 1,
389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976).
3. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). The Texas Supreme Court decision should be read together
with the excellent decision by the Court of Civil Appeals which contains a much more
complete recitation of the factual background to the Hopkins case, 535 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976).
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quadraplegic when the Chevrolet pick-up truck in which he was a passen-
ger went out of control. Hopkins had purchased the truck some eleven
months prior to the date of the accident. Although Robbie Hopkins was
the owner of the truck, it was being driven by his friend James Averyt when
the accident occurred. Hopkins' case against General Motors was premised
on the contention that the Chevrolet truck was equipped with a defectively
designed carburetor which caused the vehicle to accelerate in speed not-
withstanding Averyt's release of the accelerator pedal.
According to the testimony of both Hopkins and Averyt, prior to coming
into a turn, Averyt had accelerated slightly by pushing his foot on the
accelerator pedal. When he let up on the accelerator, the truck "just
jumped away." Averyt made an attempt to apply the brakes and clutch
but was unable to control the vehicle. The truck proceeded on its straight
path through the curve and after leaving the road turned over several
times. Averyt said that when he depressed the clutch he heard a "loud
roar of the engine." Hopkins described the sound "like an airplane taking
off." Hopkins immediately dove across the seat and put his hand on the
accelerator to try to "jiggle it," believing that it was stuck. It was all to
no avail. Averyt was thrown from the truck and suffered a leg injury.
Hopkins' neck was broken by the impact of the truck turning over and he
had to be removed from the floor board of the vehicle.
B. The Defect
The 1970 Chevrolet pick-up truck, which was the focus of the inquiry in
this case had as original equipment a quadrajet carburetor whose function
was to supply a proper mixture of air and gasoline into the engine's com-
bustion chamber. In the Court of Civil Appeals, Justice Evans clearly set
forth the operation of the quadrajet carburetor and the alleged design
defect:
The quadrajet carburetor is a complex assembly of related parts, the
collective function of which is to supply a proper mixture of air and gaso-
line into the engine's combustion chamber. As the name "quadrajet"
implies, there are four pasages or "barrels" through which the flow of air
is directed. This air flow is controlled by certain "butterfly" type valves
which are opened and closed according to varying engine conditions. Gen-
erally speaking, the greater the amount of air and gasoline which flow
through this system and the greater the ratio of air-to-gasoline, the higher
degree of efficiency and acceleration achieved. For cruising and lower
driving speeds, only the two "primary" valves are activated. The driver
may, however, obtain additional bursts of power, as when passing another
vehicle, by sharply depressing the accelerator pedal and thus activating
the two "secondary" valves. In order to prevent the "secondaries" from
opening at unintended times, as when the engine is idling, the quadrajet
carburetor utilizes an external "lock-out" system. Simply stated, the
"secondaries" are "locked out" (i.e., maintained in a closed position) by
a pivoting lock-out pin which is attached to the secondary valves. This pin
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rotates and except when driving conditions require opening of the second-
ary valves, the pin is positioned or "locked" under the "lock-out lever."
Both the lock-out pin and the lock-out lever are located outside the car-
buretor housing and are not encased within the enclosure. Thus, these
parts are not protected from the elements and may be seen by looking
under the hood of the engine. It is essentially Hopkins' contention that by
reason of the defective design of the carburetor assembly, the lock-out pin
was permitted to "hang" on top of the lock-out lever with the secondaries
open, instead of returning to its position below the lever, so that the
secondaries became "locked open" and the vehicle continued to accelerate
in speed notwithstanding Averyt's release of the accelerator pedal.'
The court reviewed the record and found that there was evidence that
prior to the sale of the truck in question General Motors was aware of the
problem, i.e., that the lock-out pin could hang on top of the lock-out lever,
thus causing uncontrollable acceleration. It was also clear that for a rea-
sonable cost GM could have timely designed and manufactured a ramp-
type lock-out lever which would not permit such accidents to occur. For
all of General Motors' protestations to the contrary that such an accident
was a "physical, mechanical and theoretical impossibility,"5 the quantum
of evidence in support of the claim of design defect was substantial.' The
claim for an alternative design was supported by evidence that its cost
would be approximately one cent per car and that the -alternate design was
in fact incorporated into a later model of the quadrajet carburetor.7 In
short, there was sufficient reason to support the jury finding that the
quadrajet carburetor was defectively designed.'
4. 535 S.W.2d at 882.
5. Id. at 884.
6. The seemingly incongruous position taken by General Motors, that the accident could
not have taken place as a result of the design defect, even though in later models it took pains
to alter the design, is readily explainable. GM's expert contended that it was virtually impos-
sible for the lock-out pin to get on top of the lock-out lever during driving conditions even
when the choke rod was not properly attached. He testified that such an occurrence might
be conceivable in a "cold engine" but that under normal driving conditions it was contrary
to the laws of physics for the pin to get on top of the lever. The thrust of the expert's testimony
was that he did not believe that this accident could have occurred as a result of the inade-
quate design. Although GM contended that the design of the quadrajet was not unreasonably
dangerous, they did admit that greater safety could however be accomplished by the redesign
of the quadrajet.
7. Evidence of post-manufacture design modification was introduced in the litigation.
The appropriateness of permitting this type of evidence into a product liability case has been
a matter of considerable dispute. See Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent
Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837, 845, 852. Several courts have found no objection to permitting
this kind of evidence into the case. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.3d 113, 528
P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d
313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972). Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680 (Wis. 1977).
Contra, Cox v. General Elec. Co., 302 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1962); Price v. Buckingham Mfg.
Co., 110 N.J. Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140 (1970) and Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d
Cir. 1975).
8. In a perceptive footnote, the supreme court noted:
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"The jury was instructed that 'defective design,' as used in the charge, 'meant a carburetor
so designed . .. that it would create an "unreasonable risk of harm."' Then: 'You are
instructed that by the term "unreasonable risk of harm" as applied to the design of a product
is meant that the product, as manufactured according to such design, threatens harm to
persons using the product to the extent that any product so designed would not be placed in
the channels of commerce by a prudent manufacturer aware of the risks involved in its use,
and to the extent that the product so manufactured would not meet the reasonable expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer as to safety.' The use of 'and' here emphasized is of no
consequence in the present case, but the proper definition would be disjunctive-using 'or'
rather than 'and,' Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1974). The objective
of the alternative test of unreasonable danger, i.e., from the vantage of the prudent supplier,
is to avoid completely foreclosing liability because of either the visibility or the complexity
of the alleged defect from the vantage of the consumer." 548 S.W.2d 344, 347 n.1 (1977)
(court's emphasis).
This author has advocated a two tiered test for defect. In an article examining the concept
of defect the following argument was presented:
"Courts and commentators have perceived that there really are two separate questions in
any product liability action: (1) Does the product meet consumer expectations and (2) Does
the product meet the standards of safety which society demands from products by evaluating
risk-utility considerations? The shortcoming of the consumer expectation test is not that it
is irrelevant; it is that it is not ambitious enough. A product may well meet consumer
expectations when a danger is obvious and/or well warned against. Nevertheless, the judg-
ment of society may be that for a slight additional cost (in some instances at no cost) design
modifications could eliminate obvious dangers which are both substantial and hazardous.
This would then seem to force us back into a general risk-utility case when the product has
failed to meet the common expectations of society for product performance.
"The answer to this dilemma is that a two-tiered test should be utilized. The consumer
expectation test is an excellent standard below which no product should be permitted to fall.
If plaintiff establishes that realistic consumer expectations with regard to the product have
not been met then the product is defective-without further considering risk-utility princi-
ples. If society's views, as gauged through the eyes of the average consumer, are unrealistic
then it is the function of the marketing system to bring them back into line. To hold a
manufacturer to a standard which reflects normal expectations appears eminently fair. Thus,
a plaintiff should be free to make out a case of defect based on the failure of the product to
meet consumer expectations. If the finder of fact determines that the product has failed the
consumer expectation test, a defect has been established. If that defect was causal of the
plaintiff's harm a prima facie case has been established.
"The converse, however, is not true. A finding that the defendant has met the consumer
expectation test will not necessarily absolve him of liability. It may still be possible that
utilizing the second-tier test, that of 'unreasonable risk' based on risk-utility considerations,
a court may find that a product which meets consumer expectations as to what the product
is does not meet society's expectations as to what the product should be. To be sure, we ought
not be prepared to go off the deep end and impose liability cavalierly on products that
conform with consumer expectations. But, the underlying question is whether society will,
through its judicial system, ever demand more than an honest product and will require a safe
product as well. Although honesty and safety in a product often coincide, they are not
matching ends of a bookcase. The safety standard may be more demanding than the honesty
standard. The cases overruling the patent danger rule can be read in no other way." Twerski,
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts,
60 MARQ. L. REV. 296, 311-313 (1977).
In Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., No. 627-755 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Jan. 16, 1978), the California
Supreme Court has apparently adopted this approach to the defect problem substantially
modifying Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972). The court in Barker held that:
"[A] trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is defective in design (1) if
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C. The Alteration
The Fulton Street Incident. Several weeks prior to the accident, Hop-
kins, while driving his truck on Fulton Street in Houston, Texas, had an
episode with his truck similar to the one that occurred on the date of the
accident. He had pushed down on the accelerator to pick up speed and
then released the pedal. Instead of the speed decreasing when he let up on
the pedal, the truck took off "in a roar." Since he was on a straight stretch
of road, Hopkins was able to bring the truck to a stop by applying his
clutch and brake. Hopkins dismounted the truck to examine the engine,
when a mechanic friend happened upon the scene. They discovered that
the lock-out pin was positioned on top of the lock-out lever. The mechanic
returned the lock-out pin to its proper position but noticed that before he
had done so that the secondary valves were partially opened. The reader
is asked to bear the "Fulton Street Incident" in mind. Its bearing on the
pivotal legal issues in this case is significant.
The Holly Carburetor and Back to the Quadrajet. Subsequent to the
incident on Fulton Street, but prior to the date of the accident Hopkins
decided to remove the quadrajet carburetor from his truck and replaced it
with a "Holly" carburetor. The reason for the replacement apparently had
nothing to do with the Fulton Street Incident but rather stemmed from
Hopkins' desire to increase the speed and efficiency of the truck. Hopkins
removed the quadrajet from the truck manifold and, using an adaptor
plate, installed the Holly in its place. One week later Hopkins found it
necessary to remove the Holly carburetor because it was causing his engine
to "flood out," and replaced it with the original quadrajet.
The replacement of the quadrajet was not accomplished with the deft
skill of a surgeon. Indeed, General Motors contends that the reinstallation
amounted to "butchery" of its quadrajet carburetor system, in that Hop-
kins altered the original design as follows:
(1) by failing to connect the choke rod; (2) placing the thermostatic coil
cover on backwards and in raised position; (3) "Burring" the end of the
lock-out pin; (4) improperly connecting the distributor spark advance
vacuum hoses; (5) using a nail instead of a cotter pin in the main accelera-
tor rod linkage; (6) and (7) using improper gasket materials between the
carburetor and the manifold; (8) using improper bolts and screws to
mount the carburetor to the manifold; (9) using a rubber hose instead of
the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant
fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors discussed above, that on balance the benefits of
the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design."
It should be noted that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant when design defect is
alleged if causation is established. The defendant must prove that a risk utility analysis would
lead to the conclusion that the product is not unreasonably dangerous.
[Vol. 29
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a metal hose to connect the gasoline line; (10) using wire instead of
clamps to attach gasoline line; and (11) stretching and reversing the accel-
erated return spring?
In reviewing the evidence, the Court of Civil Appeals found evidence to
support the causal connection between only one change made by Hopkins
in and around the carburetor and the subsequent accident. The court
noted the "testimony that when the choke rod was disconnected the choke
could be 'blown open' under such circumstances that the lock-out pin
could be positioned on top of the lock-out lever with the secondaries open."
The court concluded that the jury could find that the disconnected choke
rod contributed to the malfunction of the carburetor system. For reasons
which we shall discuss at length at a later point," the Texas Supreme
Court found that the defendant had not supported its claim of a causal
connection between the alteration and the accident through the failure of
the plaintiff to connect the choke rod. Instead it focused on the testimony
of one expert witness that the lock-out pin was caused to hang above the
lock-out lever because Hopkins had improperly installed the thermostatic
coil cover.
II. CAUSATION
A. Cause-in-Fact
It is axiomatic that products liability cases do not differ from ordinary
negligence cases in the requirement that cause in fact must be estab-
lished." This means that it is necessary to prove not merely that the
product caused the plaintiff's harm but that the defect was the causative
agent. In the normal case this is done by applying the sina qua non or but-
for test to the injury event. 2 But-for the defect would the injury have
occurred? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the defect which inhered
in the defendant's product is not deemed responsible for the injury. In
testing the culpability of plaintiff's conduct, the selfsame test is to be
applied. If the plaintiffs harm would have occurred even absent his faulty
conduct, then it is not causal and he is not to be barred from recovery nor
9. 535 S.W.2d at 887.
10. See text accompanying notes 19 and 20, infra.
11. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, 672 (4th ed. 1971); Midwestern V.W.Corp. v.
Ringley, 503 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1973); Long v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., [June 1970-
July 1973 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 6958 (Tenn. May 8, 1973); Technical
Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
12. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. OF CHI. L. Rv. 69 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts] for a comprehensive discussion of the role of the sina qua non test. It is clear that
Dean Leon Green continues his strong opposition to an independent but-for test as an element
of a torts-product liability cause of action. Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and
402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185, 1197-1199 (1976).
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to have his recovery reduced by the doctrine of comparative fault. 3 Fault
which has had no practical consequence has no juridical significance.
These statements of black-letter law are a convenient starting point for
a discussion of causation problems. It has long been recognized that judi-
cial behavior in tort cases does not conform to the standard that causation
must be proved by the balance of probabilities. 4 Causation has an
accordion-like quality which can be expanded or contracted to fit the case
and the policy demands of the cause of action at hand. As an instrument
in the hands of a sensitive trial judge it can be used to either choke off cases
at their very inception or to allow them to go to the jury when the objective
evidence at hand is slim at the very best. The evidence is substantial that
appellate courts have encouraged a flexible causation standard and that,
when the limits of flexibility are exceeded, they have been willing to
tamper with traditional burden of proof principles to insure that liberal
liability rules are not undone by rigid causation dogma.' 5
The Hopkins case itself provides good evidence that cause-in-fact will
be tailored to meet the exigencies of the case. Early in the decision the
court was required to evaluate whether the plaintiff's alteration was causal
in bringing about the accident." The jury had found that the alteration by
Hopkins was "a producing cause" but not the "sole producing cause" of
the accident. Given the nature of the defective design and the suggested
alteration, which would have made it impossible for the lock-out pin to
hang out on top of the lock-out lever, they could not have found otherwise.
The defective design of the carburetor was a cause-in-fact in the "but-for"
sense. A better design would have avoided the accident without regard to
plaintiff's alteration. *The question now turned to whether the Hopkins
alteration had contributed to the accident. The Court of Civil Appeals
found sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of a causal connection
between the alteration and the resultant harm.
The Texas Supreme Court took a more critical view of the sufficiency of
the defendant's proof on the causation issue. Although defendant had
listed eleven different ways in which plaintiffs butchery of the carburetor
could have contributed to mispositioning of the lock-out pin, the court was
dissatisfied with the assertion that such alterations could have contributed
to the accident.
[Alt great length, GM experts testified about the changes made by Hop-
kins in the reinstallation of the carburetor and how these changes might
13. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, §65, 421 (4th ed. 1971).
14. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956) and, Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, supra, note 12.
15. Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970);
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d
51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th
Cir. 1974) and Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974).
16. 548 S.W.2d at 348.
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have been a factor in causing the accident. Almost all of this testimony
tells of the possibilities of what could have happened ...
• . . The testimony in this record about possible causes, while relevant,
is no more than speculation and conjecture as to what occurred at the time
of the accident and cannot alone support a finding that there was a causal
connection between the "misuse" and the accident. (citation omitted) If
the manufacturer or supplier of a dangerously defective product is to
relieve himself of all or part of the liability for damages caused by the
defect, then he must prove cause-in-fact connection of any misuse or
alteration by the same standard as the user faced in connecting the prod-
uct defect and his damages. 7
The court's treatment of the causation question is significant for several
reasons. First, although the court talks about misuse or product alteration
as a defense to a product's action, if we were to apply normal tort princi-
ples, it would be plaintiff's burden to establish that the alleged intervening
cause should not be considered because it had no cause-in-fact effect. We
must realize that in Hopkins the plaintiff clearly prevailed on the defect
issue. And there was, as pointed out earlier, no question but that the defect
was a cause in fact of plaintiff's harm. Hopkins' alteration of the carbure-
tor could not turn the defective design into no defect. Nor could it accom-
plish the elimination of the causal relationship between the defect and the
harm. There was only one argument left in denying the prima facie case.
The defendant could challenge the plaintiff on the issue of intervening
cause. By introducing the activity of Hopkins (or any other party for that
matter) in altering the product, the defendant left the question of interven-
ing cause for the plaintiff to establish.
If plaintiff is to carry his burden on proximate cause he must do so by
either negating the practical or legal effect of the alleged intervening
cause. " This can be done by demonstrating that the alteration was not the
cause in fact of the harm. If that fails, plaintiff must establish that his
intervening act was not so significant that it should supercede the act of
the defendant in designing the defective product. By negating the argu-
ment that his own actions were so unforeseeable that defendant ought not
to bear responsibility for them, the plaintiff completes his own prima facie
case.
The Texas court did not follow this traditional line of thinking. It de-
manded that once defect is established by the plaintiff, any argument of
misuse, even in the "proximate cause" sense, becomes a matter of defense
with the burden on the defendant to establish the cause-in-fact connection
between the alleged intervening cause and the injury. Thus, what had
traditionally been an aspect of plaintiff's burden of proof now becomes a
matter of affirmative defense.
17. Id. at 348-349 (court's emphasis).
18. See, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§44-45, 270-290 (4th ed. 1971).
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There is a second point that merits serious attention. In determining
whether the defendant had adequately established its burden, the court
held that the defendant must prove cause in fact by the same standard
that the user faces in connecting the product defect and his damages. It
found that GM had not established such a connection by setting forth mere
possible causes of the accident. This amounted to no more than specula-
tion and conjecture. The Court of Civil Appeals, in evaluating the evi-
dence, reached a different conclusion. They found that:
[Tihe jury could have determined that the choke rod was disconnected
at the time of the accident and that this resulted from Hopkins' careless-
ness in reinstalling the quadrajet carburetor. It could also have deter-
mined from the testimony that this condition facilitated the lock-out pin
becoming positioned on top of the lock-out lever with the secondaries
open. 9
It is not new to discover that what is speculation for one court is a jury
issue for another. It is, of course, difficult to believe that the Texas court,
faced with overwhelming evidence of defect and good causal possibilities
which explain the occurrence of an accident in a most plausible fashion,
would refuse to let the case go to a jury.n Faced, however, with the
"misuse" defense, not only did the court shift the burden of proof but then
went on to find that the standard for establishing causation was not met.
The refusal to accept evidence that the carburetor alteration increased the
probabilities that the lock-out pin would position itself on top of the lock-
out lever indicates the degree of disfavor in which the "misuse" defense is
held. Ultimately the court was able to point to unequivocal expert testi-
mony to establish cause in fact arising from the alteration. One expert
testified that it was the mispositioning of the thermocoil cover which con-
tributed to the accident. Absent this testimony, the combination of ex-
19. 535 S.W.2d at 888.
20. The statement in the text is not merely a matter of surmise. In Hopkins there is reason
to conclude that experts merely testified to the possibility that the defective design of the
carburetor caused the accident. The Court of Civil Appeals noted this aspect of the testimony.
They said: "Despite testimony to the effect that the gravitational and mechanical forces upon
the lock-out system usually returned the secondary pin to a position below the lever, there
was also testimony that the secondary pin could bypass the lever as a result of engine
vibrations resulting from a rough and bumpy road. Based upon Mr. LaRue's testimony and
that of two other Hopkins witnesses, Mr. Lloyd Koenig and Dr. Douglas F. Muster, and upon
evidence obtained from General Motors' own files and witnesses, the jury could have con-
cluded that it was possible to hang the lock-out pin on top of the lock-out lever during driving
conditions and while the secondary valves were in an open position." 535 S.W.2d at 884
(emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that the Texas Supreme Court was only upset by the testimony of
causal possibilities with regard to the plaintiff's misuse. They did not express chagrin that
the causal effect of the design defect was using the self same criteria. Hence the double
standard referred to in the text finds support in Hopkins itself.
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treme alteration and high causal probabilities would not have sufficed to
raise the misuse defense.
B. Comparative Cause-in-Fact
The Texas- Supreme Court did not set forth a doctrine of comparative
cause-in-fact. It did indicate that plaintiffs recovery would be limited "to
that portion of his damages equal to the percentage of the cause contrib-
uted by the product defect."2 The meaning of this statement will be the
subject of later discussion. Whatever its meaning, it is clear that the Texas
court is willing to accomplish damage apportionment based on the relative
roles of the parties vis-a-vis the proximate cause issue.
It is time to consider the use of the comparative fault doctrine to include
within its sweep not only fault and proximate cause but cause-in-fact as
well. In my opinion, the inevitable effect of instructing a jury that proxi-
mate cause is an item for comparison will be that cause-in-fact will be
factored into the jury's consideration. How can the doctrine of comparative
fault cover cause-in-fact? If we rely on traditional thinking, it cannot. In
the Hopkins case, either the alteration by Hopkins of the carburetor con-
tributed to the accident, or it did not. If, as the court tells us, it is the
defendant's burden to establish by the balance of probabilities that the
alteration was causal, then if that burden is not met, the defendant fails
in his proof. No one can really half cause an accident.
As a statement of fact and pure logic, it is clear that cause-in-fact is not
subject to apportionment. But in our saner moments, we ought to be ready
to admit that cause-in-fact is one of the most intractable items to prove
in a law suit. How indeed are we to know whether Hopkins' failure to
connect the choke rod when he reinstalled the original quadrajet carbure-
tor did in fact contribute to the accident? The use of the hypothetical but-
for to prove causation presumes that the process of mental "instant re-
play" of the accident is a valid fact-finding endeavor. More than one
reputable scholar has taken issue with that thesis."
It is, however, no longer necessary to torture ourselves with an all or
nothing rule in causation. We need no longer declare that if it is more
probable than not that a party caused harm then causation is established
at 100%. Juries should be allowed to consider the likelihood at a percentage
basis that a party's activities caused harm. Thus, in assessing the reduc-
tion of plaintiffs recovery in Hopkins, we ought to take into account the
possibilities that his alteration contributed to the harm. In assessing this
21. 548 S.W.2d at 352.
22. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962),
reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 249 (1965); Green, Strict Liabil-
ity Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1976) and
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Function
Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1.
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we would take into account the aggregate of possibilities from all of the
eleven items of butchery accomplished by Hopkins on the carburetor. To
be sure, many of the eleven items if considered alone would deserve rejec-
tion when causation was considered. But in the aggregate there may be a
significant chance that Hopkins' faulty installation connributed to his
harm. On the other hand, the jury might consider the Fulton Street inci-
dent in which the carburetor demonstrated its runaway capabilities even
prior to Hopkins' butchery. The question is a difficult one. But, we ought
to permit the jury the luxury of considering causation as a function of
likelihood of its occurrence.
In reality I believe that this will occur when cases are turned over to
juries on a comparative fault instruction. Jurors, not being schooled in the
separate pigeon holes created by tort teachers, are still naive enough to
believe that an accident does not take place in five stages. Duty, standard
of care, cause-in-fact, proximate cause and damages are supposed to be
analytical aids. They are not descriptive of the process of accomplishing a
tort. Thus, juries will have to be excused if they view the entire injury event
as a unitary whole and factor the probability of causation together with
fault in arriving at a percentage apportionment. It is inevitable that the
issues will be merged in the minds of the jurors. It is not inevitable that
judges will in the face of a mechanism which has the capability of appor-
tioning damages continue to apply all or nothing causation principles on
the cause-in-fact issue. The willingness of the Texas court to permit legal
or proximate cause to be apportioned but to insist that cause-in-fact be
established on balance of probabilities is indicative of how tenacious is the
hold that traditional doctrines have on the court. But, there are indications
from other cases that courts are willing to factor the uncertainty of the
causal connection into fault apportionment.2 3 The willingness of the court
in Hopkins to recognize that proximate cause is subject to apportionment
can only hasten the recognition that all or nothing options should be in-
dulged in by courts only when there are strong policy grounds to support
them.2 4 In the absence of such grounds percentage comparisons are more
honest and contribute to the fair administration of justice.
C. And a Time to Tell the Truth
The role of the expert in technological litigation has come under heavy
23. See cases cited supra, note 2.
24. In some instances this author believes that comparative fault absolves the manufac-
turer of substantial responsibility for product defects which have as their intended purpose
the prevention of plaintiff misconduct. In such instances the author would opt for an all or
nothing rule. See Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Product
Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 796 (1977). This position was specifically rejected by the drafters of
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REv. 373 at nn. 45 & 46 (1978).
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scrutiny. 5 In no area is the role of the expert so uncomfortable as when
the issue to be addressed is causation. In another forum the author has
expressed the reason why this issue causes experts such consternation:
The reason for this phenomenon is elementary. The plaintiff is always
forced, after the fact, to establish that his harm resulted from the unrea-
sonably dangerous characteristic of the product. Since instant replay of
accidents is not available (they are not videotaped for posterity), the
plaintiff must rely on expert testimony to establish causation. The stan-
dard test, which requires proof based on "reasonable scientific probabil-
ity," is almost invariably tied to some form of the hypothetical question.
This ploy requires the expert to hypothesize a set of events and conclude
causation from them. In preparing the defense on this issue, the defen-
dant's expert goes through the identical process. The standard technique
of cross-examination involves changing the facts of the hypothetical to
demonstrate that at some point the plaintiff's expert's opinion is no longer
valid.
It is a sad commentary on the litigation process that as of the last
quarter of the twentieth century no one has yet raised the question of the
integrity of this kind of evidence. To be sure, the hypothetical question
has been challenged as a technique, but not because of the inherent unreli-
ability of untested theoretical propositions."s
25. Donaher, Piehler, Twerski and Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303 (1974) and Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler and Don-
aher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425 (1974).
26. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher, Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 534 (1976). In a
footnote to the quotation cited in the text, the authors discussed the hypothetical question.
We said:
"Criticism of the hypothetical question has primarily centered around the following obser-
vations: (1) the hypothetical question usually is inordinately complex, convoluted, and highly
confusing to the jury; (2) it provides an opportunity for highly partisan presentation of the
facts, since counsel by careful selection of facts favorable to his client shapes a one-sided and
often unrealistic hypothesis; (3) the question is often used by counsel as a summation or
restatement of his case to the jury; and (4) the question is often used as an illegitimate tool
to impeach the general credentials of the expert apart from his ability to speak to the issue
at bar. See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §16, at 36-37 (2d ed. 1972). To respond to these criti-
cisms several Model and Uniform Acts have been promulgated which provide that the hypo-
thetical question should be eliminated as a necessary means of eliciting expert opinion evi-
dence. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULES 402-10 (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 56-61
(1953). Under these acts the expert is permitted to testify without stating the underlying facts
of data upon which he bases his conclusion. See FED. R. EVID. 705; CAL. EVID. CODE §802
(1966); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §4515 (McKinney 1963). The cross-examiner must expose the
weakness of the factual basis of the expert's opinion.
"It may well be that abolishing the long factual dissertation, which was the hallmark of
the hypothetical question, is an adequate response to the criticism that it is too complex and
unwieldy a method for eliciting an expert opinion, to the causation question. . .. On any
score the hypothetical question is grounded in logical inductive reasoning of the first order.
'[lit is a strange irony that the hypothetical question, which is one of the few truly scientific
features of the rules of Evidence, should have become that feature which does most to disgust
men of science with the law of Evidence.' 2 J. WIGMORE, [Evidence] . . . §686, at 812, (3d
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The net effect of utilizing a standard which requires proof of causation
by the balance of probabilities is to force experts into unconscionable all-
or-nothing positions. If one must testify as to reasonable scientific proba-
bility, then the admission by the expert that other hypotheses may be
supportable as well has a tendency to weaken the expert's legitimate opin-
ion. As a result, experts feel compelled to take hard-line positions at either
extreme rather than thoughtful intermediate positions which reflect their
true opinions on the matter. The experts in the Hopkins case exemplify
the problem. The General Motors expert took one extreme position. He
concluded that it was a "physical, mechanical and theoretical impossibil-
ity" for the lock-out pin to hang on top of the lock-out lever during warm
engine operation if the choke rod were attached. Plaintiff's expert differed
sharply and testified that the accident could have happened as a result of
the lock-out pin causing the secondary valves to remain open. Similarly,
when the question was the role of the plaintiffs alteration of the carbure-
tor, the witness whose testimony was given credence was the one who
testified with a firm opinion that it was the mispositioning of the thermo-
coil cover that contributed to the accident. The testimony of the General
Motors witness who testified that the disconnected choke rod could have
contributed to the lock-out pin riding up was dismissed as too speculative.
The lesson for experts is clear. Their testimony will be given more cred-
ence and will at least present a triable issue of fact when they exaggerate
and overstate their case. If they testify to significant possibilities and to
what could have happened, they may be within the realm of speculation.
It is one thing for an attorney to suborn perjury. It is quite another for
the litigation system as a whole to invite it. If the nature of the causation
inquiry as part of the entirety of a torts case would be to include the
likelihood of occurrence as one of the factors in the fault apportionment,
we would go a long way to insuring that expert testimony would reflect
honest probabilities rather than the gross exaggerations which are pres-
ently in vogue. Thus, in addition to the fairness to the parties we may add
the gloss of improving the climate of expert litigation. It may actually
bring to the courtroom theater, experts who have heretofore shunned expo-
sure to cruel cross examination which exposes the excesses in which they
never should have indulged in the first place."
ed. 1970). For an empirical and philosophical look at causation and hypothetical questions,
see D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING §V, pt. 1 (1907).
"Nevertheless, the basic problem remains. Counsel for either side is permitted to establish
or destroy an opinion by presenting highly theoretical and untested propositions."
27. It should be noted that for those who follow the analysis of Dean Leon Green on cause-
in-fact, the issue presented herein is one of law for the court as part of its duty risk analysis.
See authorities cited supra note 22. Whether Professors Green and Thode would be willing
to permit either proximate cause or cause-in-fact to become part of fault apportionment is
doubtful.
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III. THE MANY FACES OF MISUSE
It is often said that misuse is a defense in product liability suits. Gener-
ally speaking, this is true, because there are a variety of points upon which
the unintended or reasonably unforeseeable use or alteration of a product
may be relevant to the liability of the supplier of a product. The misuse
may bear upon the issue of whether the product was defective when it left
the hands of the supplier or the misuse may bear on the issue of what
caused the harm.28
For the purposes of this discussion it will be helpful to work with one
basic fact pattern so that we can indicate how the plaintiff's misuse can
affect each of the major elements of a cause of action in products liability.
Consider the following example:
The Wonderful Kitchen Blender, Inc., manufactures a kitchen blender
for home use. It utilizes'/" glass for the blender container. The purpose
of the blender is to reduce soft foods, such as chicken, turkey, etc. to liquid
form and to grind vegetables together with liquid to coarse liquid sub-
stance. It is plaintiff's contention that the glass container is defectively
designed and hence unreasonably dangerous. The contention is that /"
glass should have been utilized and that the glass should have been shat-
terproof.
Case No. 1 - Mrs. Jones placed a rib steak with the bone attached into
the blender. After gyrating for sixty seconds, the glass container broke,
shattering into pieces, and blinded Mrs. Jones.
Case No. 2 - Mrs. Jones placed some vegetables in the blender and
;,turned the blender on. She turned her back and just then Jack, her preco-
cious five-year-old son, uncovered the glass container and placed a spoon
into the blender. The glass shattered immediately, blinding little Jack in
one eye.
A. No Defect - Product Not Unreasonably Dangerous
The statement is often made that misuse negates plaintiff's prima facie
case since it may go to disprove the allegation that the product was defec-
tive. The court in Hopkins set forth this aspect of the "misuse" defense,
indicating that when misuse is used in this manner it is not really a matter
of defense. If a user utilizes a product in a totally unforeseeable fashion,
then the product simply may not be defective:
We cannot charge the manufacturer of a knife when it is used as a
toothpick and user complains because the sharp edge cuts. A harness hook
is not necessarily defective simply because it breaks while being used to
hold up a 1700-pound weight. . . .There are a number of cases where the
28. 548 S.W.2d at 349 (emphasis added).
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manufacturer installed or supplied a safety guard or shield but injury
occurs after the purchaser of the machine removes or casts aside the safety
device. The foreseeability of that deviation in the manufacturer's in-
tended use of the product is relevant to the basic question of whether the
product was unreasonably dangerous when and as it was marketed .2
Undeniably the misuse of the product by the plaintiff may be a factor
in determining whether the product was unreasonably dangerous but it
does not tell the whole story. Consider Case No. 1
Mrs. Jones placed a rib steak with the bone attached into the blender.
After gyrating for sixty seconds the glass container broke shattering into
pieces and blinded Mrs. Jones.
The contention of the plaintiff was that the blender should have been
designed with thicker, shatterproof glass. One factor to be considered in
establishing whether the glass was unreasonably dangerous is whether nor-
mal consumer use patterns include permitting a rib steak with a bone
attached to gyrate for sixty seconds in the blender. The probability of such
occurrences may be so rare and the cost of preventing against such hazards
so expensive that we may decide that the blender is dangerous but not
unreasonably dangerous. Note that the foreseeability of the particular mis-
use is only one factor in the overall risk-utility calculus in deciding whether
the product is unreasonably dangerous. It is possible that a court might
conclude that a thicker, shatterproof glass is an important feature to pre-
vent against shattering due to normal breakage. We would then have to
face the question of whether this particular misuse (i.e., rib steak in the
blender) should be included with the calculus of the risk (proximate cause)
before imposing liability.
The reality of a product liability case is that the immediate injury trig-
gers an inquiry as to whether the product is "unreasonably dangerous."
That inquiry, although focused to the particular injury, may legitimately
encompass the total design of the product and other risks as well. These
risks must then be weighed against the cost of taking precautionary mea-
sures to prevent the product from causing injury.3 1
In the blender case we might conclude that the cost of making the
blender container both stronger and shatterproof is prohibitive. We would
then conclude that the blender is not unreasonably dangerous. We might
decide that the only reasonable preventive is a warning attached to the
29. Id.
30. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 17 (1965); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Fischer, Products Liabil-
ity-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co.,
485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1973); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076
(5th Cir. 1973); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) and
Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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product at the time of original sale, although we are cognizant that warn-
ings have limitations and may often not be read or be forgotten after they
are read. It may be the best we can do. The misuse which caused injury
forced us to examine the risk level of the product. If we find that the misuse
is a rather isolated event and that to prevent its reoccurrence would im-
pose either high costs or affect the utility of the product, then the product
will be exonerated and labeled non-defective.
It is important to note that the court in Hopkins made such an inquiry
with regard to the quadrajet carburetor and concluded that there was
ample evidence to support the jury finding that the quadrajet was defec-
tively designed. For one cent per car it was possible to design a lock-out
lever which could not ride up and cause the secondaries to open. The
butchery of the carburetor by Hopkins, although unforeseeable, did not
make the carburetor design safe. There was sufficient evidence that the
cost of redesigning the carburetor was so minimal that it should have been
accomplished in order to prevent even the very remote possibility that the
lock-out pin would position itself on top of the lock-out lever.
B. No Cause-in-Fact
A product may be defective and unreasonably dangerous and an acci-
dent may have followed its use. This does not mean that the defect caused
the harm. There may have been conduct on the part of plaintiff or third
persons that was solely responsible for the harm. Thus, the product defect
may not have been causally related to the injury.
Let us assume that a jury were to find that the Wonder Kitchen Blender
was defectively designed in that the glass container should have had 1/4°
shatterproof glass; it is not certain that if the glass shattered during use,
that a plaintiff will recover. Case No. 2 illustrates the problem.
Mrs. Jones placed some vegetables in the blender and turned the blender
on. She turned her back and just then, Jack, her precocious five-year-old
son uncovered the blender and placed a metal spoon into the blender. The
glass shattered immediately, blinding little Jack in one eye.
Even if the blender is defectively designed, it will be necessary to deter-
mine whether the defective design was the cause of plaintiff's harm. If it
is determined that a well designed 14 shatterproof glass blender would
crack and toss forth glass under the impact of a metal object, then the
defect (the inadequate design) may not be the cause in fact of the injury.
If the injury would have happened even with the better design, then causa-
tion has not been established.
It should be noted that in this instance the misuse forces us to focus in
on the defect to determine whether the defect was operative in causing the
injury. It introduces an alternative explanation for the injury which may
lead us to the conclusion that the defect was not implicated in this injury.
Such non-defect alternatives are not limited to misuse by either the plain-
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tiff or third persons. They may be acts of nature such as a car with defec-
tive brakes failing to stop after hitting an icy patch on the road. The icy
patch may have been the sole cause of an accident if it is determined that,
even had the car been equipped with good brakes, it could not have
stopped.
In an earlier section it was suggested that cause-in-fact should be a
subject of fault apportionment. Where the plaintiff is a possible alternate
cause and it is his conduct that is under examination, there is a mechanism
(comparative fault) which permits the issue of the possible effect (i.e., the
likelihood of its causal relationship) of the plaintiff's behavior to go to the
jury. Where, however, the plaintiff is not at fault and the only question
before the court is whether the defect was the cause-in-fact of the plain-
tiff's harm, there is no readily available mechanism to reduce the defen-
dant's liability taking into account the problem of the doubtfulness of the
causation issue. This problem will receive more direct attention in a later
section.'
C. Foreseeable Misuse
In attempting to establish a prima facie case, plaintiff may be able to
establish both defect and cause in fact but still be faced with the question
as to whether the plaintiff's injury is properly assignable to the product
defect. Is the injury within the scope of the risk created by the design
defect? Whether the question is posed as a scope of risk question or as a
duty question is irrelevant at this stage of our discussion. Whatever the
modality for accomplishing a limitation on liability, it is clear that the law
of torts must find some way to accomplish this task. For most courts
"proximate cause" has been the analytical tool which they utilize to in-
quire as to whether liability should attach to the particular injury under
the facts peculiar to the case before them.
In some intances the question of the foreseeability of the misuse may go
to the question of defect itself. Indeed, sometimes the only reason for
declaring a product defective is that a foreseeable misuse may occur. Thus,
for example, those courts which follow Larsen v. General Motors"2 and
31. See text accompanying notes 65 and 66, infra.
32. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir 1968). The Larsen position now represents the overwhelming
majority opinion. See Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C.Cir. 1976); Ford Motor
Co. v. Evancho, 327 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270
(8th Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47
(1971); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Frericks v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976) (applying North Carolina law);
Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975); Perez v.
Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Louisiana Law); Polk v. Ford Motor
Corp., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Missouri law); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724,
217 N.W.2d 831 (1974); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.
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permit a cause of action against an automobile manufacturer for not de-
signing a car so that it will reduce or prevent injury upon collision, impose
liability solely because of a possible misuse. These cases have properly
taken the position that, although a collision is a misuse of an automobile,
it is foreseeable. Manufacturers should then be required to provide safety
features which will minimize the injuries caused by such foreseeable mis-
uses. It is important to note that in these instances the defect (i.e., lack of
second collision safety devices) arises only because of the misuse problem.
If a court determines that a design defect exists because the manufacturer
has failed to include such safety devices, there is no proximate cause ques-
tion of any moment left to consider. The very reason for declaring the
design defective was to prevent this kind of foreseeable misuse. Proximate
cause could not, in such a case, present an obstacle on the grounds of
misuse. To do so would negate the very reason for declaring the design
defective in the first instance.
This kind of case should be contrasted with the more common proximate
cause case where the product is declared defective for reasons not solely
dependent on possible misuse. The question before the courts in this class
of cases is whether the misuse is within the scope of the risk of the product
defect. Ritter v. Narrangansett Electric Co.3 is illustrative. In Ritter, suit
was brought against both the retailer and manufacturer of a stove for
injuries sustained by minors while playing in the kitchen of their home.
Brenda, age four, attempted to look into a pot atop the stove in which
water was boiling in order to discover what mother was cooking for supper.
She opened the oven door, which was a drop-type door, and placed her foot
on the edge of the door with the intention of standing on it to look into
the pot. As she put her weight upon the door, the range toppled over,
trapping Brenda and her sister Norma beneath it. At the same time the
pot of boiling water scalded the two children.
The evidence against the manufacturer of the stove, American Motors,
revealed that when weights of approximately thirty pounds or more were
placed upon the door, the range was so designed that it would tip forward.
The court decided that a jury could conclude that as a result of the design
of the range the danger in the use of the oven door as a shelf was foreseea-
ble. The defendant could thus be negligent in either failing to warn about
the danger or in not designing the stove with a better center of gravity.
2d 644 (1973); Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); McMullen v.
Volkswagen of America, 274 Or. 83, 545 P.2d 117 (1976); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298
F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (applying Pennsylvania law); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C.
202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973);
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying Virginia law);
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974); Arbet v.
Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975); Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57 Ill. 2d 94,
311 N.E.2d 128 (1974).
33. 283 A.2d 255 (R.I. 1971).
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Having decided the defect question, the court still had to face the ques-
tion of abnormal use or misuse. To be sure, if Mrs. Ritter had placed a
thirty-pound turkey on the oven door and the stove had tipped, there
would be little question that injury was within the scope of the risk created
by the defect. But the injury did not occur in that manner. Instead, Brenda
decided to use the oven door as a step-stool to peer onto the top of the
range. This raises questions akin to the classic proximate cause cases. Is
the plaintiff a modern-day Mrs. Palsgraf? Is the manner of the occurrence
so unforeseeable that it is not fair to assign this harm to the product
defect? Is this injury less a result of product defect and more a result of
children who are not being properly supervised? No one has yet devised a
perfect formula to resolve this kind of proximate cause question and prob-
ably no one ever will. In this instance the court sent the issue of abnormal
use back to the trial court for a jury determination as to whether the injury
had been the product of an abnormal or improper use of the range.
The problem of whether a particular use is or is not foreseeable raises
some very special problems when the theory of the case is strict liability.
When a case proceeds along negligence grounds proximate cause can raise
the question as to whether the particular injury was foreseeable. The gra-
vamen of the tort of negligence is the failure of the defendant to act reason-
ably under the circumstances. What he knew or should have known is
relevant to the decision of whether liability should be imposed. If the
resultant harm was so unforeseeable that it could not properly be consid-
ered a consequence of defendant's negligence, liability will not be im-
posed.3 4 In strict liability, however, the issue is not whether defendant
knew or should have known of the risk. Strict liability has properly been
described as negligence with the scienter requirement removed. It would
thus appear improper to base a proximate cause instruction on foreseeabil-
ity criteria. In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.3 5 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted the problem. They said:
The trial court further confused the standards of strict liability in its
charge on proximate cause. The court charged that, in order for it to be
said that a defect caused plaintiff's injury "such a consequence, under all
the surrounding circumstances of the case, must have been foreseeable by
the seller." To require foreseeability is to require the manufacturer to use
due care in preparing his product. In strict liability, the manufacturer is
liable even if he has exercised all due care. Foreseeability is not a test of
proximate cause; it is a test of negligence. Because the seller is liable in
strict liability regardless of any negligence, whether he could have foreseen
a particular injury is irrelevant in a strict liability case."
34. This phrasing of the issue is similar to that suggested in R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN
THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (1963).
35. 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
36. Id. at 900 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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This aspect of the misuse problem arose in the Hopkins case. The jury
was asked to determine not only whether the quadrajet carburetor was
defective, but whether the alteration by Hopkins constituted a misuse. The
trial court instructed the jury that misuse meant "a use of the vehicle in
which it is mishandled in a way which the manufacturer could not have
reasonably foreseen or expected in the normal and intended use of such
vehicle. "I'
There has been real disagreement as to whether the limitation on liabil-
ity (legal cause) should be accomplished through a duty-risk analysis or
the proximate cause rubric. Dean Leon Green has long championed the
duty-risk approach to this question." Under this approach, a court should
focus on the specific risk that gave rise to plaintiffs harm and question
whether, given the circumstances of the case before the court, the legal
system's protection extends to the plaintiff or the class of which he is a
member? Dean Green has argued that a judge must consider a broad range
of factors in deciding whether the legal system's protection extends to the
particular case:
The determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the partic-
ular risk imposed on the victim ultimately rests upon broad policies which
underlie the law. These policies may be characterized generally as moral-
ity, the economic good of the group, practical administration of the law,
justice as between the parties and other considerations relative to the
environment out of which the case arose. They are found in all decisions
whether based on former decisions of the court or on a fresh consideration
of the factors found in the current environment. It need not be added that
the scope or extent of duty in any case can only be resolved by the learn-
ing, experience, good sense and judgment of the judge-the molding of law
in response to the needs of the environment.39
Under Dean Green's duty-risk analysis, foreseeability plays a role in
determining whether a duty exists but not a dominant role. He has specifi-
cally addressed the question:
Foreseeability may be a relevant factor for the judge to consider; other
factors may and are usually more important in the determination of the
defendant's duty; the fact of risk in the particular case is what actually
took place as a result of defendant's conduct, not what was foreseen by
the actor as likely to take place, and it is this risk that must be brought
into focus by the court's judgment on the duty issue. 0
This analysis is in a sense tailor-made for strict liability in which negli-
gence need not be proven." In determining whether a specific risk is within
37. 548 S.W.2d at 348 n.2 (emphasis added).
38. See authorities, cited in note 22, supra.
39. Green, Duties, Risks, Causation, Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. Rzv. 42, 45 (1962).
40. Id. at 58 (emphasis in original).
41. Dean Green has discussed the operation of his duty-risk analysis as it affects strict
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the scope of the legal system's protection, a judge will have to consider the
entire panoply of social, moral, and economic factors. It is really not terri-
bly important whether foreseeability is or is not a factor in the judge's
determination. Even in a negligence case when dealing with the legal cause
question, foreseeability only addressed itself to the moral aspect or the
justice of holding a defendant for an unforeseeable event. This is one but
only one consideration. If foreseeability is removed as an element of liabil-
ity, the judge will still have to grapple with the other social, economic, and
administrative factors which Dean Green believes are crucial to the deter-
mination of legal cause. Furthermore, since the issue of legal cause is a
judicial determination rather than a jury question, there is no great harm
in the judge including foreseeability as a mitigating factor in determining
the scope of the defendant's liability." Under a duty-risk analysis, the
issue of the scope of the legal system's protection never goes to a jury. It
would never be the subject of a jury instruction. The only question would
be for the court; and it could or could not factor in foreseeability in its
determination of the duty-risk issue.
A somewhat more difficult problem is presented to those courts and
scholars who favor the proximate cause approach.4 3 Under this analysis the
question that is central to the legal cause inquiry is whether the risk which
resulted is properly attributable to the defendant's negligence. Since n'egli-
gence is the creation of unreasonable risks, it must be determined after
negligence has been established that the particular risk comes within the
scope of the risks created by the original negligence. If one pays more than
lip service to this kind of analysis then it is clear that foreseeability is an
important consideration in determining whether a particular risk comes
within the scope of the original negligence. Since the legal cause issue is
for the jury, the phraseology of the jury instruction becomes a matter of
some moment.
product liability in Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of
Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1201 (1976). He notes that foreseeability-expectancy con-
cerns are only one aspect of the duty question which must be decided by the court.
42. But cf. Green, id. at 1201-1202, 1219. Dean Green states that if the judge is in doubt
about the risk of injury or any of its facets, the trial judge will frequently submit the violation
of duty issue to the jury and await its verdict before making a final determination on whether
the risk of injury falls within the scope of the seller's duty. This view seems strangely out of
line with other writings by Dean Green. See authorities cited supra note 22. It does appear
that the jury's role even in this new version of Green's formulation of the duty question is
only advisory. The final duty decision belongs to the judge.
43. Keeton, Legal Cause in the Law of Torts, Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv.
1 (1953) and Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1939).
For a recent discussion of the proximate cause approach from a severe critic see Thode, Tort
Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between
Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1 [hereinafter cited as Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v.
Proximate Cause].
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If we posit a theory of strict liability, then foreseeability or scienter is
eliminated as a factor in establishing liability. How, then, is the legal cause
issue to be framed? How will the law account for those unusual, unlikely,
or unforeseeable injuries once the foreseeability factor is shorn away from
the legal cause analysis? There are several answers to the question. First,
jury instructions even under the regime of negligence did not always advert
to the foreseeability factor. Ofttimes the jury instructions use such words
as "substantial factor," "natural and probable," or "direct causation" to
describe the legal cause requirement to the jury. That these instructions
masked the true issue from the jury who were charged with deciding the
issue has been noted by Professor Thode, a long-time foe of the proximate
cause approach." Nonetheless, if courts are willing to live with a vague
instruction in negligence cases, there is no reason to become squeamish
merely because the issue is strict liability. What is, after all, sought after
is a visceral reaction by the jury as to whether the harm which resulted is
too attenuated and remote from the original harm to impose liability. The
question in products liability is really the same. Is the injury so unusual
and so unlikely that it is no longer just to attribute it to the defective
product?
A second and better approach would be to frame the legal cause instruc-
tion in such a way that it focuses on the abnormality of the use, thus
avoiding the foreseeability language entirely. The New York pattern jury
instructions accomplish the task in an effective manner. They provide:
Defendant claims that the [product] was reasonably safe but that
injury occurred because the product was not used for the purpose and in
the manner normally intended. If you find that the [product] was used
for a purpose and in a manner not unlike that which could be expected
from the average consumer then you will find that the product was used
for the purpose and in the manner normally intended. If, however, you
find that the product was subject to use which in purpose or in manner
was unexpected and abnormal, you will find for the defendant.4'
A third approach is to do just what the court did in Hopkins and phrase
the instructions in terms of foreseeability. If that offends our sense of
symmetry, in that basic liability is defined absent foreseeability, and legal
cause returns to foreseeability as an operative term, one can respond that
even in the negligence context foreseeability did not really mean foreseea-
bility. Dean Prosser has pointed out that within the context of proximate
cause foreseeability is an inaccurate and overworked word. What is often
really at work is not foreseeability but hindsight. Dean Prosser notes that:
The Restatement of Torts has offered much the same approach by saying
that the defendant is not to be liable for consequences which, looking
44. Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty Risk v. Proximate Cause, supra note 43, at 15.
45. NEw YoRK PATTERN JURY INSTRUcTIONS - CIVIL §2:141 (Vol. 1 1974).
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backward after the event with full knowledge of all that has occurred,
would appear to be "highly extraordinary." The language may be unfor-
tunate; to one gifted with omniscience as to all existing circumstances, no
result could appear remarkable, or indeed anything but inevitable, as a
matter of hindsight. . . .Perhaps the Restatement has come close to ex-
pressing the underlying idea of a limitation of liability short of the remark-
able, the preposterous, the highly unlikely, in the language of the street
the cock-eyed and far-fetched, even when we look at the event, as we
must, after it has occurred. 6
It is not crucial that this concept be transmitted to juries. It is the
standard for the judge in determining whether to direct a verdict. Even if
there is something lost in the translation by sending the jury an instruction
based on foreseeability, the harm done is not significant. The juries face
this question together with the issue of standard care and damages. It is
their task to bring common sense to the torts process. The harsh judgments
are to be made by the courts. As noted earlier, jury instructions in the
proximate cause area rarely reflect the considerations which the trial judge
or the appellate courts must undertake in deciding whether legal cause is
made out. I do not excuse the situation. I only note that the proximate
cause instruction in product liability cases need not have greater integrity
than the instructions which are standard fare in negligence cases.
D. .Foreseeable Misuse and Contributory Fault-Examining the
Interplay
If it is determined that the misuse of the product by the plaintiff or third
party is within the range of foreseeability and that the defect is responsible
for the plaintiff's harm, the prima facie case is complete. It still remains
necessary to examine plaintiff's conduct to determine whether a plaintiff
whose conduct was foreseeable should have his recovery barred or reduced
because of his contributory fault.
The Hopkins court took the position that plaintiff's contributory fault
should not bar nor reduce recovery so long as the plaintiffs conduct was
foreseeable. The court said: "We reject misuse as a defense where the
product is dangerous for its foreseeable use and that danger is a producing
cause of the injury of a bystander or a user who has not himself made some
unforeseeable use of the product." 7 The only defense to a strict products
liability case in Texas appears to be voluntary and unreasonable assump-
tion of a known risk.4" In Hopkins the court added a new defense. Plaintiff's
verdict would be reduced by the percentage of his contribution to harm if
his misuse were unforeseeable. In the next section we shall examine this
aspect of comparative causation. Before we enter that morass it is worth-
46. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §43, 268 (4th ed. 1971).
47. 548 S.W.2d at 351 (emphasis added).
48. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
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while examining the position of the Texas court that absolves the plaintiff
from contributory fault if his conduct falls short of voluntary assumption
of a known risk. In essence, this is the position adopted by the majority of
American courts which have faced the problem. It is endorsed by the
Restatement of Torts (Second), §402A, comment n:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negli-
gence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability
cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or con-
sumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he
is barred from recovery.
There is substantial question whether the substance of the comment
will withstand the onslaught of the comparative negligence doctrine. Pro-
fessor Schwartz has argued that the Restatement position was justified
only so long as contributory negligence or assumption of the risk were a
complete bar to plaintiff's recovery. 9 However, now that courts have avail-
able to them the doctrine of comparative negligence in which both contri-
butory negligence and assumption of the risk go only to reduce the plain-
tiff's recovery, it is unfair to saddle the defendant manufacturer with the
entire loss." It is only fair to make the plaintiff bear that portion of the
49. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 204-207 (1974) and Schwartz, Strict Liability
and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171, 177 (1974).
50. A number of courts have supported the use of comparative negligence: West v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (the West court apparently would not apply
comparative fault when the fault is in failing to discover a defect or to guard against the
possibility of its existence); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 547 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1977);
Edwards v. Sears & Roebuck, 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools
Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H.1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976),
modifying the court's earlier decision in the same case reported at 543 P.2d 209 (Alas. 1975);
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp. 411 F.Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Stannard
v. Harris, 380 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1977) (the court applied comparative negligence even though the
plaintiff alleged both negligence and breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness). The New York Comparative Fault Statute applies to strict tort liability. See discus-
sion infra note 55 and 56. Contra, Kinard v. The Coats Co., Inc., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App.
1976); Melina v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that applying Ne-
braska slight-gross comparison statute, NEB. REV. STAT. §25-1151 (1964), would be confusing
in a strict liability case); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr.
605 (1976); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal.3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1976); Hoelter v. Mohawk, 170 Conn. 495, 365 A.2d 1064 (1976) (dissent chastising majority
for not applying comparative fault). In Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362
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loss which represents his fault contribution to the injury event. This author
has taken sharp issue with this position. It has been my position that
indiscriminate use of the comparative fault doctrine will partially negate
the imposition of duties which the law sought to place on manufacturing
defendants.5
It is well beyond the pale of this article to undertake a full examination
of the role of comparative fault in products liability. I have focused on that
subject in another forum. 52 It is important, however, to demonstrate that
neither "foreseeable misuse" nor "voluntary and unreasonable assumption
of a known risk" are categories of plaintiffs conduct which either should
be automatically exculpated or included in recovery. Consider, for exam-
ple, the important court of appeals decision of Micallef v. Miehle Co. 53 in
which the New York court overruled the patent-danger rule which absolved
a manufacturer for all design defects which were patent or obvious.
Plaintiff, Paul Micallef, was employed as an operator on a huge photo-
offset printing press. One day while working on the press plaintiff discov-
ered that a foreign object had made its way onto the plate of the unit. Such
a substance, known to the printing trade as a "hickie," causes a blemish
or imperfection on the printing page. In order to correct this situation
plaintiff informed his superior that it was his intention to "chase the
hickie." The process of "chasing hickies" consists of applying, very lightly,
a piece of plastic about eight inches wide to the printing page, which is
wrapped around a circular plate cylinder that spins at high speed. The
rvolving action of the plate against the plastic removes the "hickie." While
(Minn. 1977), the Minnesota Supreme Court applied comparative negligence principles in a
products liability case among joint tortfeasors. The language of the decision would lead one
to believe that it would apply comparative negligence between plaintiff and a product liabil-
ity defendant as well. In the dissenting opinion Justice Rbgosheske notes that the comparison
was accomplished between two negligent tortfeasors. Although there was a strict liability
count as well, the majority did not focus on that aspect of the case. The dissent argues that:
"If my assumption is incorrect and apportionment of fault is to be extended to defective
product cases where liability is based on breach of warranty or strict liability, apportionment
of fault would require a wholly different comparison of the fault-producing relationship be-
tween the parties. Factors such as size and technical expertise surely would be important
considerations in assessing relative culpability between, for example, a large manufacturer
and a small neighborhood variety store or one-man installer. I doubt that an intelligible rule
or jury instruction could be fashioned which would permit a jury to apply equitable principles
necessarily required to justly apportion liability." 255 N.W.2d at 372.
In light of the fact that Justice Rogosheske was joined by three other members of the court
in his dissent, it would appear that the outcome of the comparative fault question as between
plaintiff and a product liability defendant is in doubt. The arguments made by the dissent
with regard to fault apportionment between joint tortfeasors would apply a fortiori to the
plaintiff and a product liability defendant.
51. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product
Liability Concepts, 60 MMIQ. L. REv. 297, 339 (1977) and Twerski, The Use and Abuse of
Comparative Negligence in Product Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797 (1977).
52. Id.
53. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
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plaintiff was engaged in this maneuver the plastic was drawn into the nip
point, grabbing his hand between the plate cylinder and an ink-form roller.
The photo-offset machine had no safety guards to prevent such an occur-
rence and plaintiff was unable to quickly stop the machine because the
shut-off button was distant from the point of operation of the machine.
The plaintiff, Micallef, was fully aware of the danger of getting his hand
caught in the press while "chasing hickies." It was, however, the custom
of the industry to "chase hickies on the run," because once the machine
was stopped, it required at least three hours to resume printing. An expert
witness testified that good engineering practice would dictate that a safety
guard be placed near the rollers since the danger of human contact at the
point of operation was well known. The court realized that even though
this design modification was both reasonable and feasible, the patent-
danger rule would demand that recovery be denied. In rejecting its long
held position that the obviousness of the danger is to be the only criterion
for judging the safety of a product the court relied on the astute observa-
tions of Professors Harper and James. They contend:
[Tihe bottom does not logically drop out of a negligence case against the
maker when it is shown that the purchaser knew of the dangerous condi-
tion. Thus if the product is a carrot-topping machine with exposed moving
parts, or an electric clothes wringer dangerous to the limbs of the operator,
and if it would be feasible for the maker of the product to install a guard
or safety release, it should be a question for the jury whether reasonable
care demanded such a precaution, though its absence is obvious. Surely
reasonable men might find here a great danger, even to one who knew the
condition; and since it was to so readily avoidable they might find the
maker negligent. 4
The New York court having decided that liability exists even for a patent
defect must now face the question whether the plaintiff's contributory
fault should be a defense to a strict liability action.55 This question is now
complicated by the fact that New York has enacted a comparative fault
statute which is intended to apply to strict products liability cases as well
54. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §28.5, at 1543 (1956). For a further
expansion of this thesis see James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J.
185 (1968); Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the
Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1974).
55. Since the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the New York comparative fault
statute (Sept. 1, 1975), it is possible that the plaintiff could be barred by either contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk. In Micallef the court reaffirmed the position it took in
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), recognizing
contributory negligence as a defense. It was plaintiff's contention that since he was perform-
ing his duties at the place and in the manner dictated by his superiors that he cannot be guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Verduce v. Board of Higher Education, 8 N.Y.2d
928, 168 N.E.2d 838, 204 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1960). This issue was not resolved in Micallef since
the case was remanded to try the issue of defect absent the impediment of the patent-danger
rule.
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as negligence.5" The statute notwithstanding, it would appear that it would
make little sense to reduce the plaintiff's verdict based on comparative
fault. The design defect in the printing machine was the failure to place a
guard at the point of operation to prevent employees who "chase hickies
on the run" from getting their hands severed. If an employee, who suffers
the very injury to be guarded against, is to be barred or to have his recovery
reduced, then the manufacturer has been absolved from all or part of the
responsibility which the law sought to impose on him in the first instance.
Thus, even if the plaintiff knew the risk and voluntarily decided to encoun-
ter it, he should be permitted to recover. Merely denoting behavior as
voluntary assumption of the risk does not mean that it makes sense in
every instance to reduce recovery.
On the other hand, merely because a misuse was foreseeable does not
mean that defendant should necessarily carry the full responsibility for
plaintiff's conduct. There are instances where the plaintiffs misuse goes
to the issue of product integrity in which both manufacturers and consum-
ers may justly be called upon to share responsibility. It will be recalled that
in Hopkins the plaintiff was made aware after the Fulton Street Incident
that the truck accelerated on its own and could not be brought to a stop.
Did not some duty devolve on the plaintiff (consumer) to bring this matter
to the attention of a mechanic? Admittedly, the truck had a defective
carburetor, but when such problems surface should a plaintiff be entirely
free from seeking corrective action? This problem would be serious enough
without plaintiffs incompetent tinkering with the truck. If then in re-
sponse to the problem he decides to first replace the carburetor on his own
and then reinstall the first carburetor in a sloppy fashion, it is hard to see
why plaintiff should not share in the responsibility for the injury. It should
be noted that this hypothetical differs from the actual case in Hopkins, in
that plaintiff replaced the carburetor because the truck self-accelerated
rather than because of his desire to increase the speed and efficiency of the
truck. This slight change in facts might well lead a jury to conclude that
the misuse was foreseeable. Nonetheless, it is hard to see why the foreseea-
bility of such an occurrence is sufficient to foist the entire liability on the
defendant.
It would seem that a court must first decide whether the basic purposes
of product liability law will be furthered by permitting the affirmative
defense. This is a duty question which cannot be avoided by asserting that
in all product cases assumption of the risk is a defense or that foreseeable
misuse is not a defense. These blunderbuss statements cover too much
territory with too broad a brush.
56. New York adopted the "pure" form of comparative negligence for causes of action
accruing on or after September 1, 1975, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §1411-1413 (McKinney 1976).
The legislative intent in New York was to have the comparative-fault statute apply in strict
liability actions, 1975 N.Y. Laws 1485-86 (McKinney).
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E. Unforeseeable Misuse-The Doctrine of Comparative Proximate
Cause
We turn now to the most interesting and novel aspect of General Motors
v. Hopkins. It will be recalled that the Texas Supreme Court found that
there was ample evidence to support the following findings of fact:
(1) The quadrajet carburetor was defectively designed; and
(2) The plaintiff, Robbie Hopkins, had "misused" the carbure-
tor in that he had mishandled it in a way which the manufacturer
could not have reasonably foreseen. The misuse was thus unfore-
seeable.
Given a defective product and unforeseeable misuse, how should the par-
ties be treated by the court? The court recognized that this was the prob-
lem it was facing. It said so clearly.
This brings us to our case: where an unreasonably dangerous defect of
the product and its unforeseeable misuse are concurring causes of the
damaging event. Does the injured user recover all or none or a portion of
his damages? We do not find the answer in precedents in Texas or else-
where. Nor does the Restatement give us any guidance; section 402A
comment h, quoted above, applies only where the product "is safe for
normal handling and consumption." That is not the case where the facts
are that the product was defective-because of an unreasonably dangerous
design, for example-and the defect is a producing cause of the injury.57
Before turning to the Texas court's resolution to this problem, it is
necessary to examine the rather startling statement by the court that it
could find no answer to this question in precedents anywhere. Perhaps they
did not look very hard. The issue of a defective product which was subject
to unforeseeable misuse has been litigated many times. 8 The courts have
treated the question as one of intervening cause. The issue has usually been
submitted to juries to determine whether the plaintiff (or a third party)
has subjected the product to "substantial change," "misuse," or
"abnormal use." In rather extreme cases courts have directed verdicts
when they have believed that the misuse was so significant that the defen-
57. 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
58. Kerns v. Engelke, - Ill. App. 3d -, 369 N.E.2d 1284 (1977); Sun Valley Airlines,
Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Mico Mobil Sales & Leasing,
Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d 54 (1975); Olson v. Village of Babbitt, 291 Minn.
105, 189 N.W.2d 701 (1971); Mieher v. Brown, 54 111.2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973); Finnegan
v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Leistra v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 443 F.2d
157 (8th Cir. 1971); Ritter v. Narrangansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975); Ford Motor Co. v.
Matthews, 291 So.2d 169 (Miss. 1974); Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa
1977); Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 111. App. 3d 981, 360 N.E. 2d 440 (1977).
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dant's defect was no longer the proximate cause of the harm. 9 In Hopkins,
the jury found that the misuse was unforeseeable. Unless the court was
mistaken in sending the proximate cause issue to the jury, then this was a
classic proximate cause case in which the jury made a finding of fact in
favor of defendant.
The Texas court was well aware of the implications of such a finding on
intervening cause. It would have meant that the plaintiff would be de-
feated in his prima facie case. The all-or-nothing principle would have
meant that plaintiff would in this instance recover nothing. The doctrine
of comparative fault would not accomplish a recovery for plaintiff so long
as the issue of "misuse" would be submitted to the jury." If indeed the
misuse was unforeseeable then the product defect was not the proximate
cause, and if proximate cause could not be established, the prima facie
case could not be made out for the plaintiff.
The court's solution to the problem was to recognize that proximate
cause need not be an all-or-nothing issue. They held that:
[If the product is found to have been unreasonably dangerous when the
defendant placed it in the stream of commerce, and if that defect is found
to have been a producing cause of the damaging event, and if the plaintiff
has misused the product in the sense as defined by the trial court in its
charge in the present case, and if that misuse is a proximate cause of the
damaging event, the trier of fact must then determine the respective per-
centages (totalling 100%) by which these two concurring causes contrib-
uted to bring about the event. ... The defense in a product liability case
where both defect and misuse contribute to cause the damaging event will
limit the plaintiff's recovery to that portion of his damages equal to the
percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect."
Traditionalists will not understand. The defect was a cause of the injury
and the misuse was a cause. Cause cannot be apportioned, only fault. But
proximate cause is after all a legal fiction. It is an analytical tool which
helps us decide whether the harm is to be placed at the defendant's door-
step. There is no good reason why the issue raised by proximate or inter-
vening cause should not be factored into the apportionment between the
parties. The relative accountability for the end result is something which
can be taken into account in a fault apportionment. The newly drafted
Uniform Comparative Fault Act expresses this approach to the proximate
cause problem. It provides: "In determining the percentages of fault, the
trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at
59. Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); Rogers v. Unimac
Co., 115 Ariz. 304, 565 P.2d 181 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. Eads, 224 Tenn. 473, 457 S.W.2d
28 (1970).
60. But cf. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F.Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976). The court submitted the misuse issue to the jury who found the misuse unforeseeable.
Nonetheless, the court applied the doctrine of comparative causation.
61. 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977) (emphasis added).
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fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the
damages claimed."" The drafters of the Uniform Act have indicated in
their comments that the policy factors embodied in the proximate cause
concept are subject to apportionment. They say:
In determining the relative fault of the parties, the fact-finder will also
give consideration to the relative closeness of the causal relationship of the
negligent conduct of the defendants and the harm to the plaintiff. Degrees
of fault and proximity of causation are inextricably mixed, as a study of
last clear chance indicates, and that common law doctrine has been ab-
sorbed in this Act. This position has been followed under statutes making
no specific provision for it.13
It remains to be seen why the Hopkins court did not simply apply the
doctrine of comparative fault and set forth their view that in determining
the relative degree of fault the proximate cause question would be factored
in. Why did they opt for an explicit separate doctrine of comparative
causation? The reasons are several:
(1) The court had already stated that it did not believe that plaintiff's
fault should reduce his recovery if his injury was forseeable. In an earlier
section I analyzed this problem and indicated that the decision as to
whether to reduce plaintiff's verdict under a comparative fault doctrine
should depend on a broad range of factors, not only the foreseeability of
the plaintiff's behavior. Nonetheless, having committed itself to the posi-
tion that contributory fault would not work against the plaintiff, the court
was unwilling to unleash its comparative negligence statute on products
liability. It limited the reduction of plaintiff's verdict only to those cases
where plaintiff's actions were unforeseeable.
(2) The Texas comparative negligence statute is not a pure compara-
tive negligence statute but rather one of modified comparative negli-
gence. 64 Under such a modified scheme, plaintiff's negligence will be a
complete bar if his negligence is greater than the negligence of the parties
against whom recovery is sought. The court might have sought to accom-
plish an end run around the statute and permit the plaintiff to recover even
though his conduct constituted a greater percentage of fault than that of
the defendant. Hence, the court adopted comparative cause rather than
comparative fault.
(3) The Texas comparative negligence statute speaks only to compara-
tive negligence and as such is not directly applicable to strict products
liability. The court may have been reluctant to apply a comparative fault
doctrine to strict torts liability which is not based on fault. 5 By adopting
62. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT §2(b) (1977).
63. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT §2, comment (1977).
64. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §1 (Supp. 1978 Vernon).
65. There is some evidence from a recently decided case that the Texas court is reluctant
to apply the comparative negligence statute to a strict liability situation. In General Motors
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a doctrine of comparative causation it sidestepped this problem. I have
argued at length elsewhere that a court ought not to feel constrained by
negligence language in the comparison statutes when it comes to applying
the comparative principle to strict products liability. This view has been
endorsed by the drafters of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. In their
comments to Section 1 they state:
Although strict liability is sometimes called absolute liability or liabil-
ity without fault, it is still included. Strict liability for both abnormally
dangerous activities and for products bears a strong similarity to negli-
gence as a matter of law (negligence per se), and the fact-finder should
have no real difficulty in setting percentages of fault. Putting out a prod-
uct that is dangerous to the user or the public or engaging in an activity
that is dangerous to those in the vicinity involves a measure of fault that
can be weighed and compared, even though it is not characterized as
negligence."
It is my belief that all of the above stated factors probably had some
impact on the court's decision to opt for a distinct doctrine of comparative
causation in products liability cases. This is, however, a temporary way
station. When the courts come to realize that contributory fault in prod-
ucts cases is a complex matter which must be decided on clear policy
grounds they will gradually become more comfortable in utilizing their
comparative fault statutes in a discriminating fashion. It will not be every
case that is subject to apportionment, only those in which the role of
plaintiff's conduct with regard to maintaining product integrity is signifi-
cant or those in which the plaintiff has pushed the product beyond the
limits of its capacities. These situations will not be easily categorized. The
common law must do its job. Individual fact patterns will carry the day
and ultimately define the parameters of the comparative fault doctrine.
F. Some Unanswered Questions-The Role of Third Party Intervening
Cause
The discussion heretofore has focused on the use of the comparative fault
Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), a question arose as to the rights of joint
tortfeasors inter se, when one defendant was liable for negligence and the other for strict
products liability. The court held that the modified comparative negligence statute, which
was passed in 1973 (article 2212a), and which contains provisions dealing with contribution
among negligent tortfeasors, does not apply to instances where one defendant is liable for
strict liability. The court stated:"The present state of the statutory law permits apportioning
contribution upon comparisons of negligent conduct among negligent tortfeasors. It does not
provide any mechanism for comparing causative fault or percentage causation of a strictly
liable manufacturer with the negligent conduct of a negligent co-defendant." 558 S.W.2d at
862.
It thus appears that the Texas court felt restricted by the language of the comparative
negligence statute.
66. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACr §1, comment (1977).
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model to reduce a plaintiff's recovery when plaintiff's conduct was a con-
tributing factor in bringing about the harm. It has been argued that the
principle of comparative fault should be utilized to take into account
cause-in-fact and proximate cause. We now must face a more difficult
question. Given the premise that the law of torts need no longer operate
on an all-or-nothing principle, what should be the response to those cases
in which plaintiff has not been at all in fault in misusing the product, but
the misuse came about through a non-culpable third party. Will we now
revert to the all-or-nothing principle in which plaintiff will be entirely
barred if the misuse is unforeseeable, or will plaintiff be awarded a percen-
tage based not on the reduction of plaintiff's participation but on an as-
sessment of defendant's fault. It should be noted that we are now consider-
ing the kind of case where defect is established and the question is whether
the harm which resulted should be considered to be within the scope of the
product defect. Without an apportionment principle the question could be
decided either way by a jury. But, having taken the position that relative
degrees of proximity (legal cause) is a properly apportionable item, should
we now abandon the all-or-nothing principle?
A similar question can arise with regard to cause-in-fact. In a case where
there is a real question as to whether the product defect was a cause-in-
fact, should we permit the plaintiff a percentage recovery based on the
possible likelihood that it was causal? Can we utilize an apportionment
formula in a case where there has been no plaintiff fault to permit a
recovery where, absent apportionment, plaintiff would fail to make out
causation? If in fact a fair allocation of the costs would not load onto the
defendant the total cost of relatively unforeseeable uses of its product, is
it fair to do so when a non-culpable third party has contributed to the
harm? And if it is considered wise to take into account the likelihood on a
percentage basis that the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact, should
that factor be eliminated merely because there is no culpable plaintiff
whose conduct was a possible contributing factor?
Traditional thinking has always opted in favor of the totally innocent
plaintiff when faced with a defendant whose fault was the proximate cause
of the harm. But our question is now somewhat different. In the absence
of utilizing an apportionment formula, plaintiff may recover nothing be-
cause he will be unable to establish cause-in-fact or proximate cause. Can
apportionment be utilized to grant a partial recovery? And if that question
is answered in the affirmative, should the spigot be turned off in those
cases where the traditional elements of causation can be established, or
should the defendant now receive the reduction in recovery presented by
the relative unforeseeability of the misuse or the weakness in the cause-
in-fact case?
These are difficult questions that cannot be answered glibly. Professor
Calabresi has demonstrated that causation principles can have significant
impact in fostering the identification of the proper parties upon whom the
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law of torts ought to visit liability. 7 Whether these goals are best accom-
plished by a percentage apportionment will require serious study. It would
seem, however, that ultimately the manufacturing community will refuse
to pay costs that are more properly assignable elsewhere. Conversely,
plaintiffs will legitimately argue that the percentage allocation formula
should be used to their advantage to permit recovery where defect has been
established and apportionment principles can be utilized to permit less
than total recovery when causation is doubtful.
IV. CONCLUSION
General Motors v. Hopkins brought some new thinking to the law of
torts. As I have indicated, I believe that the court did not fully capitalize
on the opportunity provided it. Nonetheless, the court honestly confronted
the problem of the relative unforeseeability of the plaintiff's conduct and
factored it into a fault apportionment. There can be no other reading of
the case. New developments in the law do not come tied in nice neat
packages. General Motors v. Hopkins is no exception. But, it is a signifi-
cant beginning to resolving a long overdue problem. After two centuries of
viewing a torts case as made up of separate and discrete elements of the
cause of action, we are witnessing the move to the resolution of the torts
action by examining it as a unitary whole. That seems to make uncommon
good sense.
67. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.,
43 U. CHI. L.R. 69 (1975).
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